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Recent Developments

EEOC v. Waffle House
Employment Contract to Arbitrate Employment Related Disputes Does Not Bar
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commisson From Pursuing Victim-Specific
Judicial Relief, Such As Back Pay, Reinstatement, and Damages in an Enforcement Action For Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
By Sean McDonough

T

he Supreme Court held
an arbitration agreement in
an employment contract to arbitrate
employment related disputes does not
bar the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission from
pursuing victim-specific judicial relief
on behalf of an employee, such as
back pay, reinstatement, and
damages, in an enforcement action for
a violation in both Title VII and
Americans with Disabilities Act.
EEOC v. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct.
754,151 L. Ed. 2d 755 (2002). The
Court stated that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission is not a party to an
employment arbitration agreement
and has independent statutory
authority to bring suit in any federal
district court where venue is proper.
Id. at 758.
As a condition of his
employment, Eric Baker ("Baker")
signed an employment agreement with
Waffle House, agreeing that any
dispute or claim concerning his
employment would be settled by
binding arbitration. Baker was a grill
operator who suffered a seizure at
work and was subsequently discharged He did not initiate arbitration
proceedings. However, he filed a
charge ofdiscrimination against Waffle
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House with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
alleging a violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
The EEOC unsuccessfully
attempted to conciliate Baker's claim
with Waffle House. As a result, the
EEOC filed an enforcement action
against Waffle House in the United
States District Court for the District
of South Carolina that alleged Waffle
House's violation of the ADA was
"intentional and done with malice or
reckless indifference to Baker's
federally protected rights." The
EEOC sought victim-specific relief
such as back pay, reinstatement,
compensatory, and punitive damages
for malicious and reckless conduct.
Waffle House petitioned to stay
the EEOC's suit and to compel
arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA") or to dismiss
the claim. The District Court denied
the motion based on a factual
determination that Baker's
employment contract had not included
the arbitration provision. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals granted an
interlocutory appeal, and found an
enforceable albitration clause between
Baker and Waffle House did exist but
was not binding on EEOC. However,
the court of appeals held the EEOC

was barred from seeking victim
specific relief, because policy goals
of the FAA required giving some
effect to Baker's arbitration
agreement. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the EEOC had the
authority to pursue victim specific
relief, including reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and punitive
damages, under Title vn of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
The Supreme Court stated that
1972 Congressional amendments to
Title VII authorized the EEOC to
bring enforcement actions to enjoin
employers from engaging in unlawful
employment practices that may
include reinstatement with or without
back pay. Id. at 760. In 1991,
Congress again amended Title vn to
allow recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages by a complaining
party. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(a)(l )(1994 ed. )). More importantly,
the amendment included both private
plaintiffs and the EEOC, § 1981
a(d)(1)(A), and applied to ADA
claims, § 1981a(a)(2), (d)(1)(B). Id.
The Court found no language in the
statute suggesting that an arbitration
agreement, between private parties
affects the EEOC's statutory function
or the remedies that are available. Id.
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at 761.
In evaluating the policy
considerations implemented by the
ADA and FAA, the Court relied on
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., holding that the FAA's purpose
was to place arbitration agreements
on the same footing as other contracts.
Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 24
(1991 )). Moreover, the Court found
no ambiguity in the language ofthe
FAA that granted the same relief for
breach of an arbitration agreement as
exists at law or in equity for the
revocation ofacontract. Id.; 9 U.S.c.
§ 2. However, following the
precedent set in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the
Court recognized absent ambiguity in
an arbitration agreement, the language
of the agreement defined the scope
of the disputes and the parties
involved. Id. at 762 (citing
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 52). The
Court found EEOC was not a party
to Baker's employment agreement.
Id. Therefore, the EEOC had
independent statutory authority to
vindicate Baker's interest. Id.
The Court stated thatto limitthe
EEOC's recovery in an ADA action,
to injunctive relief, would contravene
the statutory goals. The effect ofthis
rule was to allow the EEOC to protect
the public's interest prohibiting
discriminatory employment practices.
The Court also stated that an
arbitration agreement, between an
employer and employee, had no
binding affect on any party other than
those to the contract. In addition, the
Court clarified the EEOC's authority
to bring an action for victim specific
relief, on behalf of an employee, who

is bound by a valid arbitration
agreement with their employer.
Further, the Court expatiated upon the
EEOC's avenues of recovery that
include victim specific relief such as
back pay, reinstatement, compensatory and punitive damages for
a violation of the ADA.
Currently there are issues
surfacing nationwide concerning
arbitration agreements which are
deterring employees from asserting
employment-related disputes. This
problem stems from some arbitration
agreements placing the financial
burden of the arbitral proceedings on
an employee in the event their claim
is unsuccessful. In addition, some
arbitration agreements in employment
contracts contain a fee splitting
provision which would require the
employee to pay thousands of dollars
to bring a claim. This case will allow
the EEOC to vindicate a persons
statutory rights in a judicial system
when that person is bound by an
arbitration agreement. Therefore,
ensuring that an employee's
fundamental rights under both Title VII
and the Americans with Disabilities
Act will not be trampled due to a lack
a financial resources. More
importantly, promoting a deterrentto
employers who violate individual's
rights without fear ofbacklash from
the judicial system.
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